Preface to the Second Edition |
|
xix | |
|
PART ONE Introduction and General Principles |
|
|
|
|
3 | (14) |
|
What is a Game of Strategy? |
|
|
4 | (2) |
|
Some Examples and Stories of Strategic Games |
|
|
6 | (8) |
|
|
6 | (1) |
|
|
7 | (2) |
|
``We Can't Take the Exam, Because We Had a Flat Tire'' |
|
|
9 | (1) |
|
Why Are Professors So Mean? |
|
|
10 | (1) |
|
Roommates and Families on the Brink |
|
|
11 | (2) |
|
|
13 | (1) |
|
Our Strategy for Studying Games of Strategy |
|
|
14 | (3) |
|
How to Think About Strategic Games |
|
|
17 | (28) |
|
|
18 | (2) |
|
|
20 | (7) |
|
Are the Moves in the Game Sequential or Simultaneous? |
|
|
20 | (1) |
|
Are the Players' Interests in Total Conflict or Is There Some Commonality? |
|
|
21 | (1) |
|
Is the Game Played Once or Repeatedly, and with the Same or Changing Opponents? |
|
|
22 | (1) |
|
Do the Players Have Full or Equal Information? |
|
|
23 | (1) |
|
Are the Rules of the Game Fixed or Manipulable? |
|
|
24 | (1) |
|
Are Agreements to Cooperate Enforceable? |
|
|
25 | (2) |
|
Some Terminology and Background Assumptions |
|
|
27 | (9) |
|
|
27 | (1) |
|
|
28 | (1) |
|
|
29 | (2) |
|
Common Knowledge of Rules |
|
|
31 | (2) |
|
|
33 | (1) |
|
Dynamics and Evolutionary Games |
|
|
34 | (1) |
|
Observation and Experiment |
|
|
35 | (1) |
|
|
36 | (2) |
|
The Structure of the Chapters to Follow |
|
|
38 | (7) |
|
|
41 | (1) |
|
|
41 | (1) |
|
|
42 | (3) |
|
PART TWO Concepts and Techniques |
|
|
|
Games with Sequential Moves |
|
|
45 | (38) |
|
|
46 | (4) |
|
Nodes, Branches, and Paths of Play |
|
|
46 | (1) |
|
Uncertainty and ``Nature's Moves'' |
|
|
46 | (2) |
|
|
48 | (1) |
|
|
48 | (1) |
|
|
49 | (1) |
|
Solving Games by Using Trees |
|
|
50 | (5) |
|
|
55 | (5) |
|
|
60 | (1) |
|
|
61 | (8) |
|
|
61 | (2) |
|
|
63 | (6) |
|
Evidence Concerning Rollback |
|
|
69 | (3) |
|
Strategies in the Survivor© Game |
|
|
72 | (11) |
|
|
77 | (1) |
|
|
78 | (1) |
|
|
78 | (5) |
|
Simultaneous-Move Games with Pure Strategies I: Discrete Strategies |
|
|
83 | (150) |
|
Depicting Simultaneous-Move Games with Discrete Strategies |
|
|
84 | (2) |
|
|
86 | (4) |
|
Some Further Explanation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium |
|
|
87 | (2) |
|
Nash Equilibrium As a System of Beliefs and Choices |
|
|
89 | (1) |
|
|
90 | (8) |
|
Both Players Have Dominant Strategies |
|
|
92 | (1) |
|
One Player Has a Dominant Strategy |
|
|
93 | (2) |
|
Successive Elimination of Dominated Strategies |
|
|
95 | (3) |
|
|
98 | (1) |
|
The Minimax Method for Zero-Sum Games |
|
|
99 | (2) |
|
|
101 | (4) |
|
Multiple Equilibria in Pure Strategies |
|
|
105 | (6) |
|
No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies |
|
|
111 | (122) |
|
|
113 | (1) |
|
|
114 | (1) |
|
|
114 | (6) |
|
Appendix: Some General Definitions |
|
|
120 | |