Games of Strategy,9780393974218

Games of Strategy

by ;
ISBN13: 9780393974218
ISBN10: 0393974219
Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 1999-06-01
Publisher(s): W W Norton & Co Inc
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Table of Contents

Preface xix
PART ONE Introduction and General Principles
Basic Ideas and Examples
1(14)
What is a Game of Strategy?
2(2)
Some Examples and Stories of Strategic Games
4(8)
Which Passing Shot?
4(1)
The GPA Trap
5(1)
``We Can't Take the Exam Because We Had a Flat Tire''
6(2)
Why Are Professors So Mean?
8(1)
Roommates and Families on the Brink
9(2)
The Dating Game
11(1)
Our Strategy For Studying Games of Strategy
12(3)
Summary
14(1)
How to Think About Strategic Games
15(28)
Decisions Versus Games
16(2)
Classifying Games
18(6)
Are the Moves in the Game Sequential or Simultaneous?
18(1)
Are the Players' Interests in Total Conflict, or Is There Some Commonality?
19(1)
Is the Game Played Once or Repeatedly, and with the Same or Changing Opponents?
20(1)
Do the Players Have Full or Equal Information?
21(1)
Are the Rules of the Game Fixed or Manipulable?
22(1)
Are Agreements to Cooperate Enforceable?
23(1)
Some Terminology and Background Assumptions
24(10)
Strategies
25(1)
Payoffs
26(1)
Rationality
27(2)
Common Knowledge of Rules
29(1)
Equilibrium
30(2)
Dynamics and Evolutionary Games
32(1)
Observation and Experiment
33(1)
The Uses of Game Theory
34(1)
The Structure of The Chapters to Follow
35(8)
Summary
38(1)
Key Terms
39(1)
Exercises
39(4)
PART TWO Concepts and Techniques
Games with Sequential Moves
43(36)
A Senate Race as a Sequential-Move Game
44(2)
Illustrating Sequential-Move Games
46(1)
Describing Strategies
47(2)
Rollback Equilibrium
49(4)
A Sequential-Move Game with Only ``One'' Player
53(3)
Order Advantages
56(2)
Adding More Players
58(5)
Adding More Moves
63(7)
Tic-Tac-Toe
63(2)
Chess
65(5)
Experiments in Strategy
70(9)
Summary
73(1)
Key Terms
74(1)
Exercises
74(5)
Games with Simultaneous Moves
79(45)
Illustrating Simultaneous-Move Games
80(2)
Zero-Sum Versus Non-Zero-Sum Games
80(1)
Constructing an Actual Game Table
81(1)
Nash Equilibrium
82(1)
Dominant Strategies
83(2)
When Both Players Have Dominant Strategies
85(2)
When Only One Player Has a Dominant Strategy
87(2)
Successive Elimination of Dominated Strategies
89(4)
Symmetric Games
92(1)
Weak Versus Strict Dominance
93(1)
Minimax Strategies in Zero-Sum Games
93(4)
Cell-by-Cell Inspection
97(2)
Pure Strategies That are Continuous Variables
99(5)
Three Players
104(3)
Multiple Equilibria in Pure Strategies
107(9)
Assurance
107(3)
Chicken
110(2)
The Battle of the Two Cultures
112(2)
Weak Dominance
114(2)
No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
116(8)
Summary
118(1)
Key Terms
118(1)
Exercises
119(5)
Simultaneous-Move Games with Mixed Strategies
124(39)
What is a Mixed Strategy?
125(1)
What does a Mixed Strategy Accomplish?
125(7)
The Row Player's Perspective
127(4)
The Column Player's Perspective
131(1)
Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
132(4)
Mixing in Non-Zero-Sum Games
136(7)
Chicken
136(4)
The Battle of the Two Cultures
140(3)
Further Discussion of Mixed Strategies
143(8)
The Odds Method
143(4)
Counterintuitive Outcomes with Mixed Strategies
147(2)
Using Mixed Strategies in Practice
149(2)
Mixing when one Player has Three or More Pure Strategies
151(12)
A General Case
152(4)
A Coincidental Case
156(3)
Summary
159(1)
Key Terms
160(1)
Exercises
160(3)
Appendix: Probability and Expected Utility 163(122)
The Basic Algebra of Probabilities
163(7)
The Addition Rule
165(1)
The Modified Addition Rule
166(1)
The Multiplication Rule
166(1)
The Modified Multiplication Rule
167(1)
The Combination Rule
168(1)
Expected Values
169(1)
Inferring Event Probabilities from Observing Consequences
170(3)
Attitudes Toward Risk and Expected Utility
173(5)
Summary
176(1)
Key Terms
177(1)
Combining Simultaneous And Sequential Moves
178(31)
Illustrating Games in Both Extensive and Strategic Form
179(3)
Games with Both Simultaneous and Sequential Moves
182(3)
Combined Sequential-Play and Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
185(4)
Rules Change I: Converting From Sequential to Simultaneous Play
189(3)
Solving the Sequential-Move Game From its Strategic Form
192(3)
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
195(4)
Rules Change II: Converting From Simultaneous to Sequential Play
199(10)
Summary
205(1)
Key Terms
206(1)
Exercises
206(3)
Consolidation, Extension, and Discussion
209(46)
Validity of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
210(13)
Is the Nash Equilibrium Concept Too Imprecise?
211(2)
Do Players in Actual Games Play Nash Equilibrium Strategies?
213(3)
Does Rationality by Itself Imply Nash Equilibrium?
216(2)
Does the Nash Equilibrium Account for Risks Properly?
218(1)
Is the Expected-Payoff Maximization Assumption Reasonable?
219(4)
Games of Dynamic Competition
223(9)
Calculating the Probabilities of Winning at Tennis
225(4)
Strategy in Tennis
229(2)
Applying Tennis Analysis to Business
231(1)
Nash Equilibrium With Continuous Strategies
232(2)
Mixing Among Many Strategies: Examples
234(6)
A Zero-Sum, Three-by-Three Games
234(4)
A Three-by-Three Example with Unused Strategies
238(2)
Mixing Among Many Strategies: General Theory
240(15)
Summary
247(1)
Key Terms
248(1)
Exercises
248(7)
PART THREE Some Broad Classes of Games and Strategies
The Prisoners' Dilemma Game
255(30)
The Basic Game (Review)
256(1)
Solutions I: Repetition
257(9)
Finite Repetition
258(1)
Infinite Repetition
259(3)
Games of Unknown Length
262(1)
General Theory
263(3)
Solutions II: Penalties and Rewards
266(3)
Solutions III: Leadership
269(2)
Experimental Evidence
271(3)
Real-World Dilemmas
274(11)
Policy Setting
274(2)
Labor Arbitration
276(1)
Evolutionary Biology
277(1)
Price Matching
278(2)
Summary
280(1)
Key Terms
281(1)
Exercises
281(4)
Appendix: Infinite Sums 285(298)
Games with Strategic Moves
288(32)
A Classification of Strategic Moves
289(3)
Unconditional Strategic Moves
290(1)
Conditional Strategic Moves
291(1)
Credibility of Strategic Moves
292(2)
Commitments
294(4)
Threats and Promises
298(8)
Example of a Threat: U.S.---Japanese Trade Relations
298(5)
Example of a Promise: The Pizza Pricing Game
303(1)
Example Combining Threat and Promise: Joint U.S.---European Military Operations
304(2)
Some Additional Issues
306(2)
When Do Strategic Moves Help?
306(1)
Deterrence Versus Compellence
307(1)
Acquiring Credibility
308(5)
Reducing Your Freedom of Action
308(2)
Changing Your Payoffs
310(3)
Countering Your Opponent's Strategic Moves
313(7)
Irrationality
314(1)
Cutting Off Communication
314(1)
Leaving Escape Routes Open
314(1)
Undermining Your Opponent's Motive to Uphold His Reputation
314(1)
Salami Tactics
315(1)
Summary
315(1)
Key Terms
316(1)
Exercises
316(4)
Evolutionary Games
320(36)
The Framework
321(3)
The Prisoners' Dilemma
324(7)
The Twice-Played Prisoners' Dilemma
326(3)
Multiple Repetitions
329(1)
Comparing the Evolutionary and Rational-Player Models
330(1)
Chicken
331(3)
The Assurance Game
334(3)
Interactions Across Species
337(4)
The Hawk-Dove Game
341(4)
Rational Strategic Choice and Equilibrium
341(1)
Evolutionary Stability for V>C
342(1)
Evolutionary Stability for V<C
342(1)
V<C: Stable Polymorphic Population
343(1)
V<C: Each Individual Mixes Strategies
344(1)
Some General Theory
345(2)
Dynamics With Three Types in The Population
347(3)
Evolution of Cooperation and Altruism
350(6)
Summary
352(1)
Key Terms
353(1)
Exercises
354(2)
Collective-Action Games
356(41)
Collective-Action Games with Two Players
357(5)
Numerical Examples
358(3)
Generalization of the Two-Person Case
361(1)
Collective-Action Problems in Large Groups
362(6)
A Brief History of Ideas
368(1)
Solving Collective-Action Problems
369(8)
Analysis
371(4)
Applications
375(2)
Spillovers, or Externalities
377(11)
The Calculus of the General Case
380(1)
Negative Spillovers
381(4)
Positive Spillovers
385(3)
``Help!''---a Game of Chicken With Mixed Strategies
388(9)
Summary
392(1)
Key Terms
393(1)
Exercises
394(3)
Uncertainty and Information
397(38)
Controlling and Manipulating Risk
398(5)
Strategies to Reduce Risk
398(3)
Using Risk
401(1)
Manipulating Risk in Contests
402(1)
Some Strategies to Manipulate Information
403(6)
Literal and Strategic Liars
405(1)
King Solomon's Unwisdom
406(3)
Incentives to Induce Effort
409(3)
Screening and Signaling
412(4)
Separation and Pooling
416(8)
Separating Equilibrium
419(1)
Pooling Equilibrium
420(1)
Semiseparating Equilibrium
421(3)
Some Evidence for Signaling and Screening
424(2)
Additional Reading on Information Manipulation
426(9)
Summary
427(1)
Key Terms
428(1)
Exercises
429(6)
PART FOUR Applications to Specific Strategic Situations
Brinkmanship: The Cuban Missile Crisis
435(27)
A Brief Narration of Events
436(7)
A Simple Game-Theoretic Explanation
443(2)
Accounting For Additional Complexities
445(6)
A Probabilistic Threat
451(3)
Practicing Brinkmanship
454(8)
Summary
459(1)
Key Terms
459(1)
Exercises
460(2)
Strategy and Voting
462(32)
Voting Rules and Procedures
463(4)
Binary Methods
463(1)
Plurative Methods
464(1)
Mixed Methods
465(2)
Voting Paradoxes
467(6)
The Condorcet Paradox
467(2)
The Reversal Paradox
469(1)
The Agenda Paradox
470(1)
Change the Voting Method, Change the Outcome
471(2)
Evaluating Vote Aggregation Methods
473(1)
Strategic Voting
474(7)
Plurality Rule
475(2)
Pairwise Voting
477(4)
The Borda Count
481(1)
The Median Voter Theorem
481(13)
Discrete Political Spectrum
482(4)
Continuous Political Spectrum
486(2)
Summary
488(1)
Key Terms
489(1)
Exercises
490(4)
Bidding Strategy and Auction Design
494(27)
Types of Auctions
495(2)
The Winner's Curse
497(3)
Bidding Strategies
500(1)
Vickrey's Truth Serum
501(2)
All-Pay Auctions
503(2)
How to Sell at Auction
505(4)
Risk-Neutral Bidders and Independent Estimates
506(1)
Correlated Estimates
507(1)
Risk-Averse Bidders
508(1)
Some Added Twists to Consider
509(3)
Multiple Objects
509(2)
Defeating the System
511(1)
Information Disclosure
511(1)
The Airwave Spectrum Auctions
512(9)
Designing the Rules
513(2)
How the Auctions Have Fared
515(1)
Two Specific Bidding Issues
516(2)
Summary
518(1)
Key Terms
518(1)
Exercises
519(2)
Bargaining
521(29)
Nash's Cooperative Solution
523(6)
Numerical Example
523(1)
General Theory
524(5)
Variable-Threat Bargaining
529(2)
Alternating-Offers Model I: Total Value Decays
531(3)
Experimental Evidence
534(3)
Alternating-Offers Model II: Impatience
537(5)
Manipulating Information in Bargaining
542(2)
Bargaining With Many Parties and Issues
544(6)
Multi-Issue Bargaining
545(1)
Multiparty Bargaining
546(1)
Summary
547(1)
Key Terms
547(1)
Exercises
548(2)
Markets and Competition
550(33)
A Simple Trading Game
552(8)
The Core
560(7)
Numerical Example
562(1)
Some Properties of the Core
563(2)
Discussion
565(2)
The Market Mechanism
567(5)
Properties of the Market Mechanism
569(2)
Experimental Evidence
571(1)
The Shapley Value
572(5)
Power in Legislatures and Committees
574(1)
Allocation of Joint Costs
575(2)
Fair Division Mechanisms
577(6)
Summary
579(1)
Key Terms
580(1)
Exercises
580(3)
Index 583

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